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Abstract—Email and chat still constitute the majority of
electronic communication on the Internet. The standardisation
and acceptance of protocols such as SMTP, IMAP, POP3, XMPP,
and IRC has allowed to deploy servers for email and chat in a
decentralised and interoperable fashion. These protocols can be
secured by providing encryption with TLS—directly or via the
STARTTLS extension. X.509 PKIs and ad hoc methods can be
leveraged to authenticate communication peers. However, secure
configuration is not straight-forward and many combinations
of encryption and authentication mechanisms lead to insecure
deployments and potentially compromise of data in transit. In
this paper, we present the largest study to date that investigates
the security of our email and chat infrastructures. We used active
Internet-wide scans to determine the amount of secure service
deployments, and employed passive monitoring to investigate to
which degree user agents actually choose secure mechanisms for
their communication. We addressed both client-to-server inter-
actions as well as server-to-server forwarding. Apart from the
authentication and encryption mechanisms that the investigated
protocols offer on the transport layer, we also investigated the
methods for client authentication in use on the application layer.
Our findings shed light on an insofar unexplored area of the
Internet. Our results, in a nutshell, are a mix of both positive
and negative findings. While large providers offer good security
for their users, most of our communication is poorly secured in
transit, with weaknesses in the cryptographic setup and especially
in the choice of authentication mechanisms. We present a list of
actionable changes to improve the situation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the rise of mobile messaging and some more
centralised, newer communication platforms, two forms of
electronic, (nearly) instant messaging still remain dominant
on the public Internet: email and chat. Of the two, email is
the most pervasive form of communication ever, with over 4.1
billion accounts in 2014, predicted to reach over 5.2 billion
∗The work was carried out during the first author’s time at Data61/CSIRO.
in 2018 [11]. As for chat, the most widely used standard-
based networks are IRC group chats and the XMPP instant
messaging and multi-user conferencing network.
In their early days, email protocols such as SMTP, POP3,
and IMAP were designed with no special focus on security.
In particular, authentication in SMTP was introduced a while
after the protocol’s standardisation, initially as a way to
fight spam. User agents started to move towards encryption
and authenticated connections gradually, using the then-new
SSL 3 and later the TLS protocols to protect the transport
layer. SSL/TLS can provide authentication, integrity, and
confidentiality. Where SSL/TLS is not used, user credentials
may be transmitted in plaintext, with no protection against
eavesdropping, and message bodies can be tampered with
(unless end-to-end mechanisms like OpenPGP or S/MIME are
used, which is a comparatively rare setup).
Although SSL/TLS support mutual authentication, the most
common usage pattern in the context of email and chat is
unilateral authentication: only the responder of a communi-
cation is authenticated on the transport layer. The primary
reason for this is the protocols’ reliance on an X.509 Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) for authentication purposes1 and the
subsequent need for client certification, an operation that is
expensive in practice, introduces much administrative over-
head, and often also requires user education. In most cases,
initiators are authenticated on the application layer instead,
i.e., by mechanisms that are specific to the application layer
protocol in question. Passwords schemes are the most common
choice, although any mechanism that is supported by both
initiator and responder is possible. Different password schemes
offer varying levels of security—e.g., the password may be
sent without further protection over the SSL/TLS channel, or a
challenge-response mechanism like CRAM, or even SCRAM,
may be used. The latter is particularly elegant as it does not
require the responder to store the actual password, nor is
the password ever sent over the connection. The choice of
password scheme has a profound influence on security in case
of missing authentication on the level of SSL/TLS.
The proper in-band authentication of the responder is a
1Variants of TLS that support other forms of authentication have been
standardised, but seem to be rarely used.
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key element in SSL/TLS. X.509 certificates are used for this
purpose. These are issued by so-called Certificate Authorities
(CAs), which are trusted parties whose trust anchors (so-
called root certificates) are shipped with common software
(e.g., operating systems, browsers, mail clients, . . . ). Unfortu-
nately, it is known today that X.509 PKIs often suffer from
poor deployment practices. Holz et al. [24] were the first to
show this in a large-scale, long-term study for the Web PKI.
Durumeric et al. [7] later extended the study to all Internet
hosts, confirming the earlier findings. However, no such work
exists for the electronic communication protocols on which
we rely every day.
In this paper, we present the largest measurement study to
date that investigates the security of SSL/TLS deployments for
email and chat. Based on our findings, we derive recommenda-
tions to achieve better overall security. We employ both active
Internet-wide scans as well as passive monitoring. Active scans
are used to characterise global server installations, i.e., how
servers are configured to act as responders in a SSL/TLS
connection. Passive monitoring allows us to investigate the
actual security parameters in use when initiators establish
SSL/TLS connections.
From 2015-06-30 through 2015-08-04, we actively
scanned the IPv4 address space (3.2B routable addresses),
with one scanning run for each protocol we analysed.
We connected to the standard ports for the considered
protocols: SMTP/STARTTLS, SMTPS, SUBMISSION,
IMAP/STARTTLS, IMAPS, POP3/STARTTLS, and POP3S
for email; for chat, we investigated IRC/STARTTLS, IRCS,
XMPP/STARTTLS, and XMPPS. We performed complete
SSL/TLS handshakes. This allowed us to establish a list of
current deployments (a total of more than 50M active ports),
and collect certificates, cipher suite offers, and cryptographic
parameters. Where applicable, we also sent application-layer
messages to request the list of supported methods for
authentication on the application layer. Orthogonally to
this, nine days of passive monitoring (2015-07-29 through
2015-08-06) of a link serving more than 50,000 users showed
more than 16M connections to about 14,000 different services.
We captured the same set of SSL/TLS and authentication-
related parameters from this monitoring data as we did for
active scans. This allows us to compare usage by actual clients
to the simple existence of a deployed service. As a reference
and comparison point, we also considered HTTPS and traffic
on port 443 in both active and passive measurements as the
deployment of this protocol is particularly well understood.
We analysed this data to evaluate the security of connections
and deployments. We considered the validity of the certificates
and the practices of the issuing CAs, the quality of crypto-
graphic parameters, software, and SSL/TLS versions, as well
as the authentication methods. In a nutshell, we have both
negative and positive findings to report. Considering active
scans, we find that there is much room for improvement.
For example, for the IMAPS servers that completed the TLS
handshake, we report that just under 40% also had correct
certificate chains deployed. We found such low rates for all
protocols—the best-provisioned service was in fact SMTPS,
where just over 40% of servers had valid certificate chains.
SMTP/STARTTLS, which is used to forward emails between
mail exchange servers, showed a rate of just 30%. For chat,
we found the best results for XMPPS in server-to-server
forwarding: 27% of servers offered valid certificates.
When considering data from our passive monitoring and
investigating connections rather than server deployments, the
situation seems much better, at least at a first glance: the vast
majority of connections is encrypted and uses valid certifi-
cates (with SMTP/STARTTLS again showing poorer numbers,
however). This is due to the fact that large providers such
as Gmail or Hotmail are properly configured and offer good
security, and most connections go to these providers. However,
we also found that it is common that the STARTTLS extension
is not supported by servers that receive less connections. In
these cases, connections are not encrypted at all. This is again
particularly often true for email. This phenomenon suggests a
likelihood that communication is often not sufficiently secured
in transit between mail exchange servers, unless both sender
and receiver are customers of large providers.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next
section presents background for SSL/TLS, PKI, and the stud-
ied protocols. It also gives an overview of related work. We
describe our data collection methods and datasets in Section III
and data analysis in Section IV. Based on our findings, we
identify risks and threats in Section V. We suggest some
pathways towards improving the situation before concluding
in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Standard messaging protocols
The messaging protocols in common use today have been
specified by the IETF over the years; use with SSL/TLS or
the STARTTLS extension was added later. For example, the
original RFC 821 for SMTP is from 1982, but the STARTTLS
extension for SMTP was specified in 1999. Other protocols
experienced similar organic development, and the result is a
variety of ways in which SSL/TLS is used in email and chat.
a) Electronic Mail: Email relies on two sets of protocols:
one for email transfer and one for retrieval. The Simple
Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [27] is the cornerstone of
email distribution systems. Its primary purpose was message
transfer: so-called Message Transfer Agents (MTAs) forward
messages by establishing an SMTP session to the next MTA
on the path to the destination, until they arrive at their
final destination. SMTP is also used as a submission proto-
col2: in a nutshell, user agents—e.g., ‘email clients’ such as
Thunderbird—submit mails from a local computer for further
delivery to a ‘mail server’ that is commonly operated by the
user’s service provider. ‘Webmail’ solutions such as GMail
blur the distinctions between mail submission and mail transfer
somewhat: they offer web-hosted front-ends for mail compo-
sition; mail submission and mail transfer are handled entirely
2This was possibly first made explicit in RFC 2476 [15].
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transparently on server-side. SMTP was initially operated on
port 25. Later, port 587 was specified to be used for message
submission [16] by potentially authenticated submitters, in an
attempt to differentiate between legitimate activity and spam.
Nevertheless, port 25 still remains in use for both purposes,
message transfer and submission.
Once at the destination server, email can be retrieved using
either of two protocols. The Post Office Protocol (version 3,
commonly referred to as POP3) [30] operates on port 110
and allows a remote client to download newly-received emails
to a local mailbox. The Internet Message Access Protocol
(version 4, commonly called IMAP) [4] uses port 143 and
offers access, manipulation, and download of messages in a
mailbox stored on the server side.
b) Chat and Instant Messaging: Instant chat is an old
concept, which predates even the Web. Internet Relay Chat
(IRC) [34] is a protocol that allows a number of IRC clients
to connect to an IRC server and join so-called channels (chat
rooms) or have private conversations. Messages, especially
on channels, are relayed between IRC servers. An oddity
of IRC deployments is that server-to-server communication
is implementation-dependent (despite a specification in [26]).
Over time, this has led to IRC servers clustering into a number
of distinct ‘IRC networks’. While the official IANA port for
client-to-server connections is 194, IRC is most commonly
deployed on port 6667 instead [17], but other ports are also
sometimes used. The ports for server-to-server communication
are specific to the IRC network.
In the footsteps of the proprietary instant messaging (IM)
networks of the late 1990s, the more general XML-based
eXtensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) was
specified. Its core functionality is defined in RFC 6120 [39],
IM extensions in RFC 6121 [40]. Further extensions exist.
Similar to the SMTP infrastructure, a number of XMPP
servers exchange messages on behalf of their users as part
of the XMPP IM network3. The protocol uses port 5222 for
client-to-server communication, and 5269 for server-to-server
forwarding. XMPP, with or without proprietary extensions, is
also used in non-federated enterprise or proprietary services4.
B. SSL/TLS
TLS 1.0 is the IETF-standardised version of SSL 35. All
versions before TLS 1.0, i.e., SSL 2 and SSL 3, are deprecated
today. TLS is at version 1.2 and contains many critical fixes
that remove weaknesses of previous versions. Version 1.3
is currently in the standardisation process. As SSL 3 and
TLS 1.0 are very similar and a few pockets of SSL 3 use
remain, we speak of SSL/TLS when our findings apply to
both SSL 3 and TLS. All email and chat protocols can be
used with SSL/TLS. In IMAP and POP3, only client-to-server
communication occurs. SMTP and XMPP define both client-
to-server and server-to-server communication patterns. For
3XMPP Instant Messaging was known as Jabber before its standardisation.
4E.g., HipChat uses a flavour of XMPP, as did the early Google Talk.
5SSL 3, originally created at Netscape, was never standardised by the IETF,
but later captured in a historic RFC [13].
IRC, once again only the client-to-server pattern is properly
defined.
There are two ways to negotiate an SSL/TLS session. The
first is to use SSL/TLS directly. This requires a well-known
port, i.e., assignment of a new, dedicated port by IANA.
Application layer protocols that use this method are often
indicated by adding a ’S’ at the end, e.g., HTTPS, IMAPS,
etc. Clients that do not support SSL/TLS may still connect
to the normal port. In server-to-server communication, the
servers may use certificates to authenticate to each other (i.e.,
either unilateral or mutual authentication may be used). As
stated in the introduction, in client-to-server communication it
is common that only the server is authenticated; the client is
authenticated later as part of the application layer protocol. In
the case of SMTP, port 465 was initially defined for SMTPS,
but was deprecated later [22] in favour of STARTTLS (see
below). It is nevertheless still used. The dedicated ports for
IMAPS and POP3S are 993 and 995, respectively. For IRCS,
several exist [17], with 6697 being very commonly used for
client connections. XMPP does not have standard ports for
SSL/TLS, but ports 5223 and 5270 are prevalent for client-to-
server and server-to-server communication, respectively.
The second major way to use SSL/TLS is to connect
with TCP on the normal port first and then upgrade the
connection using a protocol-specific command. This method
is commonly referred to as STARTTLS. The specifications
in the RFCs commonly require clients to first query a server
for STARTTLS support with a specific ‘capability’ command
before trying to upgrade the connection [32]. The server can
confirm an upgrade; the SSL/TLS handshake follows. This is
specified for SMTP (particularly for SUBMISSION) in [20],
in [32] for IMAP and POP3, and in [41] for XMPP. While
STARTTLS is not formally specified for IRC, the InspIRCd
implementation6 is generally considered a reference.
STARTTLS has the advantage that no dedicated port is
required and that the communication partners can decide
dynamically whether they want to use SSL/TLS. A major
limitation is the vulnerability to active MitM attacks, where
an attacker interferes with the STARTTLS-related commands.
Unless clients or servers are specifically configured not to
allow any connection without upgrade, the attack succeeds and
the entire communication will be in plain. Depending on the
user agent, users may not even be prompted with a security
warning. The attack has been observed in the wild [9].
The SSL/TLS handshake is the same for both forms of
connection establishment. The initiator sends an initial mes-
sage together with information which symmetric cipher suites
and SSL/TLS protocol versions it can support. The responder
picks a cipher suite and negotiates a protocol version in its
reply. It also sends an X.509 PKI certificate to authenticate. In
another round trip, the cryptographic parameters—which may
also include Diffie–Hellman parameters for forward secrecy—
are then confirmed. The entities that wish to authenticate also
include a proof that they are in possession of the private key
6https://wiki.inspircd.org/STARTTLS_Documentation
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Version Serial no. Sig. algo.
Issuer
Not Before Not After
Validity
Subject
Subject Public Key Info
Algorithm Public Key
X509 v3 Extensions
CA Flag, EV, CRL, etc.
Signature
X509v3 Certificate
Fig. 1: An X.509 certificate.
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Fig. 2: X.509 PKI showing the most relevant features: root
certificates, intermediate certificates, end-host certificates, a
root store and a certificate signed by an untrusted CA.
that corresponds to their certificate.
It should be noted that email transfer over SSL/TLS is
generally designed to prioritise successful transfer over any
security guarantees. An opportunistic approach to security is
often favoured by implementations: both initiator and respon-
der may choose to ignore any authentication problems and
proceed with message delivery despite errors or warnings.
C. X.509 PKI
In order for an entity to have trust into the authentication
step, a number of conditions must be fulfilled that pertain
to the configuration of the X.509 PKI in use. First and
foremost, CAs must only issue certificates after applying due
diligence in identifying the party that wishes to be certified.
The CA/Browser forum has established guidelines for the Web
use case [3]. The so-called Baseline Requirements define due
diligence to require at least an (usually automated) check if
the requesting party can receive email under the requested
domain name and a specific email address.7 However, previous
work has revealed cases where even this basic diligence was
neglected. These cases are documented in, e.g., [23, 38]. On
several occasions, CAs have been compromised. Since any
CA may issue certificates for any domain, compromise of one
CA is enough to compromise the entire PKI. More details on
relevant attacks on the X.509 PKI for the Web can also be
found in [23, 38]. Notably however, X.509’s use in email and
chat protocols remains largely unexplored.
Fig. 1 shows the format of an X.509 certificate, and Fig. 2
shows a simplified PKI. The certificates of the CAs form trust
anchors, which are distributed with operating systems and user
7There are alternatives, e.g., some form of token can be published on the
web server, and some CAs apply further checks, e.g., lookups of WHOIS.
agents like email clients (e.g., Thunderbird) or web browsers.
For instance, the Windows and OS X operating systems come
with root stores supplied by the vendors, who decide which
CAs they include. Software on this OSes generally uses the
OS-supplied trust anchors. Mozilla takes a different approach:
their products have their own root store.
CAs can issue certificates directly (a practice that is thor-
oughly discouraged; see Section IV-F) or via intermediate
certificates. Trust chains must not be broken, i.e., missing inter-
mediate certificates, chaining to root certificates that are not in
the root store, having expired certificates in the chain etc. Self-
signed certificates, where root and end-host certificates are the
same, are a special case, which we discuss in Section IV-D.
Later in this paper, in Section IV, we will discuss problematic
PKI setups after going through several observations from our
measurements.
D. Client-authentication methods
The client-to-server communication protocols examined in
this paper generally authenticate the initiator of the com-
munication on the application layer and not in-band during
the SSL/TLS handshake. SMTP did originally not require
authentication for message submission (i.e., user agent to
mail server), but this was added later to fight spam. Message
transfer between MTAs (i.e., transfer from the source MTA to
the destination MTA) does not require authentication of the
sender.
To choose the appropriate authentication mechanism, a
client is supposed to query the server for the mechanisms
it supports (e.g., using the EHLO command with SMTP,
or CAPABILITY for IMAP). The server returns a list of
supported authentication mechanisms, sorted by preference,
from which the client then selects.
Some of the most widely used mechanisms, LOGIN and
PLAIN [46], transmit user credentials without further protec-
tion (independently of whether there is an underlying SSL/TLS
connection or not). Some other mechanisms use cryptographic
functions to transmit a hashed version of the credentials
(often using deprecated hash functions such as MD5). An
adversary who is able to eavesdrop on the authentication
process can potentially recover the credentials. Challenge-
response mechanisms such as CRAM [28] and SCRAM [33]
(which also use HMAC) provide much better protection. With
these mechanisms, the password is never transmitted at all.
In the case of SCRAM, the password can even be stored in
a salted format on server-side, and hence not even a server
compromise would reveal the true password to an attacker.
E. Related work
A number of publications have studied the deployment of
network security protocols, with a focus on either the devel-
opment of generic, large-scale measurement methodologies
or the measurement and analysis of the HTTPS and SSH
protocols.
Provos and Honeyman [37] were probably the first to
carry out academic, large-scale scans of security protocols.
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Their work focused on SSH. Later, Heidemann et al. carried
out a census of Internet hosts [18]. Leonard and Loguinov
[29] presented a scanner capable of carrying out Internet-
wide scans with proper randomisation of target IP addresses.
Durumeric et al. presented the fast zmap scanner in 2013 [6].
We used zmap in our work.
Vratonjic et al. [45] carried out a scan of the top 1 million
hosts as determined by Alexa Inc. Holz et al. [24] carried
out scans of the HTTPS ecosystem in a large-scale, long-
term study over the duration of 18 months. The authors also
used data from passive monitoring (using the Bro Network
Monitor). The study showed the poor state of the Web PKI
and predicted very little movement towards improvement.
More recently, Durumeric et al. [7] presented an Internet-
wide study of the HTTPS certificate ecosystem; Huang et al.
[25] expanded on this in their investigation of forward-secure
cipher deployments in TLS. Amann et al. [2] and Akhawe
et al. [1] carried out two studies that analysed the aspects
of trust relationships of the Web PKI and the occurrence and
treatment of error cases during certificate validation in popular
implementations, again using data from passive monitoring
with Bro.
Some studies focused more on vulnerabilities in the wild.
Heninger et al. [19] studied data sets won with zmap to
investigate the cause and distribution of weak RSA and DSA
keys. In their study of the Heartbleed vulnerability, Durumeric
et al. [10] also found email and XMPP servers to be vulner-
able. Gasser et al. [14] presented a large-scale study of the
deployment of SSH in 2014, with a focus on the distribution
of insecurely configured devices.
There are not many studies that would focus on the use
of SSL/TLS beyond HTTPS. Concerning email, a recent
study [9] actively probed the most popular email servers and
observed the security of SMTP servers interacting with Gmail
over the duration of a year. The authors found that the most
popular providers did a decent job in setting up secure servers.
A paper that was not yet published at the time of our initial
submission also investigated the security of email server setups
[12]. The authors limited themselves to a relatively small
number of servers. However, an important finding of theirs
is that SMTP servers often do not verify the correctness of
a certificate in outgoing connections. In our own study, we
extend our analysis to the whole Internet, but also to client-
facing email retrieval protocols and chat protocols. On a global
scale, our findings are not as reassuring as those for the most
popular providers.
Finally, a number of online dashboards give some insight
into the current deployment of SSL/TLS: SSL Pulse for the
most popular websites8, Gmail about their SMTP peers9, or
the IM observatory for XMPP servers10. The ICSI Certificate
Notary11 also offers an online, DNS-based query system that
allows to check the validity of a given X.509 certificate.
8https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse/
9 https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/saferemail/
10https://xmpp.net/reports.php
11http://notary.icsi.berkeley.edu/
III. DATA COLLECTION
We collected data using both active scans and passive
measurement, i.e., traffic monitoring. We use our scans to
characterise global TLS deployment. The use of passive moni-
toring data allows us to understand which specifics of TLS are
actually used; e.g., which protocol versions and cipher suites
are negotiated between communication partners. Active scans
are not as suitable for this purpose: the responder chooses the
cipher suite from the initiator’s offers.
For email, we include all three SSL/TLS-variants of SMTP:
SMTP with STARTTLS on port 25, SMTPS on port 465,
and SUBMISSION with STARTTLS on port 587. For IMAP
and POP3, we chose both the pure SSL/TLS as well as the
STARTTLS variant. For XMPP, we investigate both client-
to-server and server-to-server setups, in both STARTTLS and
pure SSL/TLS variants. For IRC, we only investigate the
client-to-server communication12. We limit our IRCS scan to
the most common port, 6697, and probe for IRC STARTTLS
support on the default IRC port, 6667.
A. Active scans
In this section, we describe the process we used to perform
our active scans. We also explain some insights we gained and
some peculiar phenomena we encountered when scanning.
a) Scanner: Our scanner consists of two parts. The first
is the zmap [6] network scanner, which we used to determine
IP addresses that had ports of interest open. We scanned the
entire routable IPv4 space13, using a BGP dump from the
Oregon collector of Routeviews14 as a whitelist of routable
prefixes. We ran our scanning campaigns over several weeks,
from 2015-06-09 through 2015-08-04. Due to time-sharing
constraints on the scanning machine, we had to run the scans
at different speeds, resulting in scans of different durations, as
summarised in Table I. In general, scans lasted roughly 20-36
hours. We refrained from scanning at line speed (although this
is possible with our setup) to reduce our scans’ impact.
The second part of our scanner is a component that starts
an array of OpenSSL client instances, collects their output,
and stores it in a database. We patched the STARTTLS
implementations of OpenSSL as the current version does not
follow the RFCs. More specifically, the current OpenSSL
client does not query the server capabilities and ignores a
server’s refusal to negotiate SSL/TLS. Furthermore, OpenSSL
did not yet support STARTTLS for IRC, either.
We used a blacklist of IP ranges generated during past
scans [14, 42]. At the time of writing, it contains 177 entries
covering 2.6 million addresses (about 0.08% of the routable
space). Entries were computed from both automated and
personal emails that reached us and complained about the
scans.
12Recall that server-to-server communications are not standardised.
13Appropriate ways to scan IPv6 are an open research topic.
14http://www.routeviews.org
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TABLE I: Description of our active scan dataset containing hosts listening on ports, successful handshakes, end-host and
intermediate certificates. Entries marked with † used STARTTLS, and those with ‡ allowed fallback to SSL 3. S2S is short
for server-to-server, C2S for client-to-server.
Protocol Port Period No. hosts Successful SSL/TLS Unique end-host-certs Intermediate certs (unique)
SMTP†,‡ 25 7/27–7/28 12,488,000 3,848,843 (30.82%) 1,373,751 (35.69%) 2,243,846 (23,462, 1.05%)
SMTPS‡ 465 7/22–7/23 7,234,817 3,437,382 (47.51%) 800,574 (23.29%) 2,583,786 (10,357, 0.4%)
SUBMISSION†,‡ 587 7/27 7,849,434 3,378,009 (43.03%) 753,691 (22.31%) 2,580,305 (16,070, 0.62%)
IMAP†,‡ 143 7/25–7/26 8,006,617 4,076,809 (50.91%) 1,024,757 (25.14%) 2,406,987 (12,913, 0.54%)
IMAPS 993 7/09–7/11 6,297,805 4,121,108 (65.43%) 1,053,110 (25.55%) 2,791,451 (16,700, 0.6%)
POP3†,‡ 110 7/26 8,930,688 4,074,211 (45.62%) 998,013 (24.5%) 2,325,032 (10,135, 0.44%)
POP3S 995 7/10–7/12 5,186,724 2,797,300 (53.93%) 747,508 (26.72%) 1,795,814 (7876, 0.44%)
IRC† 6667 8/02–8/04 2,573,207 3709 (0.14%) 3003 (80.97%) 638 (84, 13.17%)
IRCS 6697 7/17–7/18 1,948,656 8661 (0.44%) 6332 (73.11%) 2551 (315, 12.35%)
XMPP, C2S†,‡ 5222 7/29–7/30 2,188,813 53,544 (2.44%) 38,916 (63.61%) 5927 (1913, 32.28%)
XMPPS, C2S 5223 7/13–7/14 2,223,994 70,441 (3.16%) 38,916 (55.25%) 32,629 (2773, 8.5%)
XMPP, S2S†,‡ 5269 7/31–8/01 2,459,666 9780 (0.39%) 6221 (63.61%) 5927 (1913, 32.28%)
XMPPS, S2S‡ 5270 7/24 2,046,204 1693 (0.08%) 1146 (67.69%) 783 (147, 18.77%)
HTTPS 443 6/30–7/09 42,676,912 27,252,853 (63.85%) 8,598,188 (31.55%) 24,555,475 (227,321, 0.93%)
b) Scanned protocols: Table I gives an overview of
our dataset from active scans. It shows the number of hosts
responding to connection attempts as well as the number of
hosts to which a successful SSL/TLS connection could be
established. The table also lists the number of unique end-
host certificates that we encountered on all machines in the
respective scans. Furthermore, it contains the number of total
and unique intermediate certificates encountered in the scans.
Note that many servers seem to have a SSL/TLS port open,
yet do not carry out successful SSL/TLS handshakes. This
phenomenon has been observed before for HTTPS [6, 24];
we encounter it again for email and chat.
Previous scans performed by us show that servers that
support only SSL 3 are very rare today. Modern Debian-
based systems do not even include it in the default OpenSSL
binary they ship. Initially, we followed their lead and did
not try to connect with an optional fall-back to SSL 3.
However, we revised that decision after inspecting data from
the passive monitoring and deciding we wanted to allow for
some comparisons. We thus enabled fall-back to SSL 3 for the
remainder of our scans.
c) Background noise: We observed a phenomenon which
has also been mentioned before by the zmap community:
independently of the port one chooses to scan Internet-wide,
there is always a number of hosts that reply to SYN packets
without carrying out a full TCP handshake later. We verified
this by scanning five arbitrarily chosen ports (1337, 7583,
46721, 58976, 65322) and sending out 100M probes each
time. We scanned twice with different seeds for each port.
Every time, the average response rate was 0.07–0.1%. When
scanning protocols with very low deployment, it is important
to keep this phenomenon in mind as one of the causes for
failed SSL/TLS handshakes. This is particularly important to
consider for less-used protocols such as IRC or XMPP.
TABLE II: Connections and servers in passive scans. En-
tries marked with † used STARTTLS. S2S is short for server-
to-server, C2S for client-to-server.
Protocol Port Connections Servers
SMTP† 25 3,870,542 8626
SMTPS 465 37,306 266
SUBMISSION† 587 7,849,434 373
IMAP† 143 25,900 239
IMAPS 993 4,620,043 1196
POP3† 110 18,774 110
POP3S 995 159,702 341
IRC† 6667 53 2
IRCS 6697 18,238 15
XMPP, C2S† 5222 13,517 229
XMPPS, C2S 5223 911,411 2163
XMPP, S2S† 5269 175 2
XMPPS, S2S 5270 0 0
B. Passive collection
For our passive measurements, we examined nine days of
traffic of the Internet uplink of the University of California
at Berkeley, which has a 10 GE uplink with a peak traffic of
more than 7 GB/s each way.
a) Traffic monitoring and capture: We used the Bro
Network Security Monitor15 [35] to gather information about
all outgoing SSL/TLS sessions. In a default installation, Bro
already offers deep visibility into standard SSL/TLS traffic,
extracting certificates and meta-information like cipher and
key use. For this work, we extended Bro to also work with
protocols using STARTTLS. We added support for STARTTLS
for the SMTP, POP3, IRC, XMPP, and IMAP protocols.
We also use Bro to extract the server’s offered authentication
capabilities for all outgoing SMTP, POP3, and IMAP sessions,
15http://www.bro.org
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which allows us to deduce how many of the contacted servers
support STARTTLS. We added support for capabilities to the
IMAP protocol analyser we created for this work; support was
already present in Bro for SMTP and POP3 capabilities.
Our passive dataset was collected from 2015-07-29 to
2015-08-06. We observed a total of 9,730,095 SSL/TLS
connections on the monitored ports. The connections were
established to 12,637 unique destination IP addresses with
10,294 distinct Server Name Indication (SNI) values and
10,164 unique end-host certificates. Table II shows the number
of connections and servers encountered per port.
Please note that our passive data set exhibits artefacts of
the collection process that are beyond our control. As our
data is collected at the Internet uplink of one university, it
is potentially biased. We assume that, due to the high number
of students with diverse cultural backgrounds, the traffic we
see is similar to traffic in other parts of the world, however.
b) Ethical considerations: We are aware of the ethical
considerations that must be taken into account when observing
passive traffic. This research strives to understand the interplay
between server and client software at the technical level
and does not concern any human subjects. For the SSL/TLS
measurements, the information that we save is constrained to
information in the SSL/TLS handshake without analysing any
later connection payload data. The campus administration has
approved this data collection. For the capability measurements,
only automatic server capability replies were recorded, which
do not contain any personally identifiable information. In ad-
dition, the University IRB takes the position that IP addresses,
which were also recorded for this measurement, are not treated
as personally identifiable.
c) Unusual traffic on standard ports: While analysing
the TLS extensions sent by clients, we noticed that there are
4,584 connections that send the Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation (ALPN) extension, which is used to negotiate pro-
tocols like HTTP2 and SPDY. Closer examination shows that
2,703 of these connections going to six servers indeed contain
values that point to them being HTTPS servers, running on
port 993 as well as 110. Manually connecting to a few of these
IP addresses shows that they are Squid proxy servers running
on non-standard ports. The remaining 1,881 connections to
780 hosts all have a destination port of 5223. The ALPN in
these cases indicates a value of apns-security-v1 and
apns-security-v2, terminating at nodes for the Apple
push notification service. We are not sure what software causes
these connections. Further traffic analysis also reveals that our
data set contains 3,728 certificates, from 9,082 connections to
110 servers, indicating that they are used by the Tor service.
We excluded all these servers from further analyses.
d) OCSP stapling: Another interesting finding is the
adoption of OCSP [31] stapling by email servers. OCSP
stapling allows TLS servers to send a proof that their certificate
is currently still valid and has not been revoked. This is
part of the TLS handshake if the client signals support for
the extension. We encountered 836 connections using OCSP
stapling, terminating at 64 different servers. The majority of
TABLE III: STARTTLS support and use. Passive monitoring
allows to differentiate server-side support from client–server
connections which were actually negotiated. S2S is short for
server-to-server, C2S for client-to-server.
Active probing Passive monitoring
Supported Supporting Offering Upgraded
Protocol & upgraded servers connections connections
SMTP 30.82% 59% 97% 94%
SUBMISSION 43.03% 98% 99.9% 97%
IMAP 50.91% 77% 70% 44%
POP3 45.62% 55% 73% 62%
IRC 0.14% – – –
XMPP, C2S 2.44% – – –
XMPP, S2S 0.39% – – –
these (706 connections and 58 servers) were on port 993
(IMAPS).
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now analyse our datasets from a security perspective.
Specifically, we examine how appropriately servers are con-
figured. We look at basic parameters such as the ciphers in
use and also consider PKI-related specifics, such as whether
the offered certificates are valid and linkable to CAs present in
the Mozilla root store, the amount of key and certificate reuse,
and whether CAs follow best practices in issuing certificates.
We finally study authentication methods offered to clients.
Where applicable, we compare our findings for email and chat
protocols with results from our HTTPS scan.
A. Use of STARTTLS vs. direct SSL/TLS
As mentioned in Section II, email and chat protocols can be
secured with SSL/TLS either by using SSL/TLS on a dedicated
port or by upgrading a TCP connection via STARTTLS.
Table I shows how many hosts supported SSL/TLS directly.
We also measured support for STARTTLS in our active and
passive scans (see table III). Our data shows that, depending on
the application-layer protocol, about 30 to 51% servers offer
STARTTLS. The STARTTLS extension is also often used in
practice. While popular servers seem to support the extension
(and thus most connections contain an offer to use it), the
results for SMTP, IMAP, and POP3 do show that there is
a significant number of servers without support. At least in
the case of IMAP and POP3, one can also see that, in a
considerable number of cases, connections are not upgraded
although the server would support it.
B. SSL/TLS versions—deployment and use
Ideally, only the latest version of TLS (1.2) should be used.
Previous versions, especially SSL 3, have vulnerabilities, many
of which are listed in RFC 7457 [44].
TABLE IV shows how often the different SSL/TLS protocol
versions were chosen by servers in active scans (in scans
that supported SSL 3). Note that we did not scan for SSL 2.
TABLE IV also shows protocol versions observed in use in
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TABLE IV: Negotiated protocol versions from active scans
with SSL 3 activated and passive monitoring.
Active probing Passive monitoring
Version Negotiated with server Observed connections
SSL 3 0.02% 1.74%
TLS 1.0 39.26% 58.79%
TLS 1.1 0.23% 0.1%
TLS 1.2 60.48% 39.37%
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Fig. 3: Use of PFS ciphers by port. Red and yellow indicate
that PFS is not used.
our passive monitoring dataset. No connections using SSL 2
were encountered.
Our result shows that just 0.03% of scanned servers only
support the old and relatively insecure SSL 3—all others
preferred one of the stronger TLS versions. However, the
percentage of connections actually using SSL 3 in our pas-
sive dataset is much higher (1.74%). There are two possible
reasons for this. Either clients connect preferentially to less
secure servers—this would not be in line with our results
for STARTTLS support in the previous section. Or there is
a significant number of clients that offer SSL 3 only, e.g.,
because they are outdated.
C. Cipher use
In SSL/TLS, the server chooses the symmetric cipher to
use, based on a list of ciphers that the client suggests.
Determining which ciphers a server supports would require
many connections to test all ciphers individually. Given that
many of those suites may never be negotiated, this is a poor
trade-off in terms of good Internet citizenship versus lessons
that can be learned.
We thus use passively monitored data to investigate which
ciphers are actually negotiated in practice. Due to the high
number of different cipher suites occurring in the wild—35 in
our dataset—we group the ciphers into categories that show
their relative strengths. Figure 3 shows the different categories.
The categories ECDHE and DHE contain suites that use
forward-secure (PFS) ciphers, either using elliptic curve or
modular Diffie–Hellmann key exchanges. The categories AES
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Fig. 4: Common errors in certificate chains, active scans. Note
that chains may exhibit more than one error, which we capture
in this figure. Thus, the results may add up to more than 100%.
and RC4 contain connections without PFS support that use
either the AES or RC4 cipher. Other categories with a use of
less than 1% of connections were omitted (an example for this
are connections using the Camellia cipher). Connections on
ports 6679 and 6667 overwhelmingly use ECDHE ciphers, and
those on port 5269 overwhelmingly use DHE ciphers. These
ports were excluded from the figure for brevity. Figure 3 shows
that there is still a surprisingly large amount of connections
on some ports that use the RC4 stream cipher.
Looking at the elliptic curves that are used in ECDHE
key exchanges reveals that 97.2% of connections use the
secp256r1 curve, followed by 2% using secp384r1 and
0.78% using sect571r1. All of these curves are considered
to be at least as strong as 2048 bit RSA, raising no immediate
security concerns. This result is similar to earlier results
concerning server support for different curves [25].
Examining the Diffie–Hellmann parameter sizes for the
DHE connections reveals that 76% of the connections use
a parameter size of 1024 bit, 22% of 2048 bit, and 1.4%
of 768 bit. While this is an improvement in comparison
to earlier studies, which measured more than 99% of hosts
only supporting 1024 bit keys and below (see [25]), this is
still relatively poor as parameter sizes below 2048 bits are
discouraged today.
D. Certificate chain validity
SSL/TLS servers send a certificate chain in the handshake
that consists of the host’s certificate and potentially inter-
mediate and CA certificates. It is common to omit the CA
certificate as it already has to be part of the local root store.
Chains can exhibit several types of errors—certificates may be
expired, host certificates may not chain up to a root certificate
in the root store, intermediate certificates can be missing,
etc. A particularly common case are self-signed certificates,
where issuer and subject of the certificate are the same. While
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Fig. 5: Common errors in certificate chains, passive scans.
Only the primary error (as reported by OpenSSL) is shown.
technically not an error, these certificates can only serve the
use case where a private server operator does either not care
about authenticated encryption (and thus often uses some
standard certificate as supplied in, e.g., Linux distributions)
or issues a certificate to herself and configures her clients to
accept it.16
a) Deployed vs. used services: We show the most com-
mon certificate errors we encountered in our active scans in
Fig. 4. Fig. 5 shows validation results for our passive mon-
itoring run by servers (i.e., counting every server once) and
weighted by connections (i.e., counting each server weighted
by the amount of connections that we saw).
This data set contains 295 cases where the same IP and
port serves more than one certificate chain. Examples for
this are Google and other company mail servers, servers
where only CA certificates were updated while the end-host
certificate was left unchanged, and servers renewing their
end-host certificates. We examined the certificates sent by
these servers and found that they all share the same validity
characteristics (i.e., in all cases either all of the certificates
sent by a host were valid or invalid).
Fig. 4 shows that the ratio of verifiable chains is between
30-40% across all email protocols. This is much lower than
what has been reported for web sites on the Alexa Top 1
million list (around 60%) [24], but much more in line with
what has been found for the Web PKI as a whole [7]. For
comparison, we also included the values for HTTPS. Looking
at the data from passive monitoring, we note that the number
of correctly validating chains is much higher when only
considering servers that actually receive connections, and even
more so when weighting this with the number of connections,
as shown in Fig. 5. This suggests that the operators of the
most popular services do a substantially better job at properly
16Many clients allow to do this by storing an exception for the host and
certificate on the first connection, thus making all subsequent connections
secure as the stored certificate is compared against the one the server sends.
configuring their server for use with SSL/TLS.
b) Invalid certificates: Self-signed certificates are the
major source of non-verifiable certificate chains in our mea-
surements. As mentioned above, clients that wish to authenti-
cate servers configured with such certificates must have out-of-
band knowledge about the correctness of the certificate. Note
that this approach only works where a self-signed certificate
was created by the administrator—default certificates, as they
are often shipped with software bundles, are useless for
authentication as a copy of the private key is also shipped
with the bundle. This is one case for certificate reuse, which
we discuss below.
Certificate chains can be broken in a number of ways—e.g.,
missing intermediate certificates, using CA certificates that are
not in the root store, etc. We grouped these errors together and
found that their number is relatively low at 10-15%. Our result
shows that, just as in the Web PKI, there are many mistakes
that can be made in certificate deployment. The number of
expired certificates, which we consider separately, is well
within previously reported ranges [7, 24], showing that there
is little difference between email and web protocols in this
regard. We also found some further errors in certificate chains
that we classified as ‘other’—these are rare and sometimes
somewhat arcane17. Just as in previous scans [24], we found
only a single-digit number of cases with broken signatures.
Looking at the different protocols in Fig. 4, we see a
difference between the email protocols and the chat protocols.
While SMTPS and SUBMISSION have the highest (yet still
unsatisfactory) percentage of verifiable certificate chains (and
IMAP, POP3, and SMTP are trailing not too far behind), the
numbers are much lower for XMPP and especially IRC. SMTP
also has a much lower rate of verifiable certificate chains in
our passive scans, at least when not weighting by number
of connections: an indication that message protection in a
number of server-to-server communications is likely to be at
higher risk (although once again, popular servers seem to be
properly configured). This is a serious problem, which is also
compounded by the findings of a recent study that ran in
parallel to ours [12]: the authors found that the servers in
their study did not verify certificates in outgoing connections
at all. It is thus reasonable to assume that many SMTP server-
to-server connections are not secure.
A staggering number of IRC servers seems to use self-
signed certificates, or deploy broken or expired chains. This
puts private (person-to-person) IRC messaging as well as
password transfers at risk. We study the case of XMPP
separately below.
c) The case of XMPP: The vast majority of certificates
deployed for the XMPP client-to-server services (5222 and
5223) are self-signed. However, an inspection of typical com-
mon names for these certificates shows that the corresponding
servers are most likely parts of proprietary deployments and
not intended for general use. The corresponding subjects
17A full list of possible errors can be found on the OpenSSL homepage;
https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/verify.html.
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for XMPP on port 5222 are shown in TABLE VI. For
XMPPS on port 5223, 48% were from a Content Distribu-
tion Network (incapsula.com), 12% from Apple’s push
service (courier.push.apple.com) and another 8% by
a Samsung push service (*.push.samsungosp.com). The
remaining certificates have shares between 2 and 5% and con-
tain variations of the subjects hub.clickmyheart.net,
icewarp.com and ejabberd—a popular XMPP imple-
mentation. We thus conclude that this port is often used for
push services, rather than instant messaging.
Consulting our passive data set confirms this conclusion.
90% (826,822) of port 5223 connections to 1,282 servers
use a SNI containing push.apple.com, with all but two
of the server IP addresses residing in Apple’s IP space18.
73,465 more connections target the Samsung service men-
tioned above, pushing the connection numbers to these ser-
vices beyond 99% of all port 5223 connections. Our passive
observations also show that the majority of client-to-server
connections have verifiable chains. This is also true when
looking at the distribution for servers only, albeit to a lesser
degree. Once again we see a preferential use of servers with
better-than-common security.
For the server-to-server ports, which are used to relay XMPP
messages, we found broken (and not self-signed chains) to
be slightly more common in our active scans (but notably
not in our passive data). It is difficult to arrive at a strong
conclusion here. The slightly lower percentage of self-signed
certificates may hint at conscious certification choices made
for server-to-server communication. Since XMPP is also used
in proprietary products (not meant for public access), operators
may have chosen to use private CAs instead of acquiring
certificates from commercial CAs. If true, we did not capture
such communication in our passive observations.
E. Key and certificate reuse
a) Certificate reuse: Holz et al. [24] showed that certifi-
cates are often reused on different IP addresses. Although IP
addresses do not equal actual hosts, the frequency at which
this phenomenon occurred provided strong indications that
reuse across machines was happening. We investigated this
phenomenon here, too. One potential reason for certificate
reuse are Content Distribution Networks (CNDs). This is a
legitimate use case where the ease of key distribution has to
be balanced against a slightly increased attack surface. One
would expect a clear difference in the distributions for valid
and invalid certificate chains in this case as CDNs can be
assumed to exercise care in deployment. Another possibility
are default certificates, potentially from software bundles or
deployed by management tools, which are not changed when
the server is further configured.
Fig. 6a and 6b plot the likelihood that ‘a certificate occurs
on X IPs’ for the entire set of certificates and only for the set
of certificates that have correct certificate chains, respectively.
18The remaining two addresses with one connection per address use an
IPv6 target address in an address space a network provider uses for NAT64;
we assume these addresses also get redirected to Apple servers in some way.
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Fig. 6: Likelihood that a certificate is used on X IPs.
SMTP 587 is SUBMISSION.
While the results for the Web PKI [24] revealed a clear
difference between the subset of certificates with valid chains
and the overall set of certificates, this is much less pronounced
here. Furthermore, the likelihood is almost the same across
the email protocols. The only real difference can be seen
for XMPP and IRC—however, we need to stress the smaller
number of verifiable certificate chains we have for these two
protocols.
We also investigated the reuse of self-signed certificates. If
these are created purposefully for a single server or service,
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Fig. 7: Likelihood that a public key is used on X IPs, across
all hosts and certificates.
TABLE V: Duplicate certificates by port in passive scans.
Entries marked with † used STARTTLS.
Protocol Port Dup. Certs Valid Dup. Certs
SMTP† 25 877 656
SMTPS 465 36 36
SUBMISSION† 587 46 46
IMAP† 143 29 28
IMAPS 993 119 111
POP3† 110 12 12
POP3S 995 43 41
IRCS 6697 3 3
XMPP, C2S† 5222 35 0
they should not occur on too many hosts. Figure 6c shows,
however, that many appear on hundreds or thousands of hosts.
Hence, a more likely explanation is that these are default
certificates shipped with software.
The reuse of certificates is naturally reflected in the number
of public keys that are unique to a host, shown in Figure 7.
Only about 15% of public keys occur on exactly one host.
b) Popularity of servers reusing cryptographic material:
We investigated whether passive monitoring would yield sim-
ilar results for key reuse. We expected a very different picture
as we assume Internet users to mostly access services of
larger providers, which are much more likely to use correctly
deployed certificate chains.
In our passive monitoring run, 1,096 (17%) of our 6,398 en-
countered certificates were seen on more than one IP address.
Table V shows the prevalence of certificate reuses per port.
As the table shows, the majority of certificate reuses happens
on port 25.
Furthermore, in our passive scans 78% of all certificates
that we see on at least 2 hosts are valid, hinting towards the
fact that many hosting providers use this for load balancing.
Indeed, examining the certificates that were seen on the most
IP addresses show a SMTP certificate by Proofpoint, Inc. that
was encountered on 263 IPs, followed by Google certificates
for imap.gmail.com (184) and mx.google.com (161).
This shows that, while there is a rampant amount of
TABLE VI: Common names in particularly frequently oc-
curring and invalid certificates for SMTP, IMAP, XMPP. †
indicates data obtained during a STARTTLS negotiation.
Common name Occurrences
SMTP†
localhost/emailAddress=webaster@localhost 35k
*.bizmw.com 34k
localhost(*) 17k
localhost/emailAddress=webaster@localhost 16k
localhost/emailAddress=webaster@localhost 6k
localhost(*) 5k
plesk/emailAddress=info@plesk.com 5k
localhost/emailAddress=webaster@localhost 5k
localhost(*) 4k
localhost/emailAddress=webaster@localhost 4k
IMAPS
*.securesites.com 88k
*.sslcert35.com 31k
localhost/emailAddress=webaster@localhost 27k
localhost/emailAddress=webaster@localhost 21k
*.he.net 19k
www.update.microsoft.com 19k
*.securesites.net 11k
*.cbeyondhosting2.com 11k
*.hostingterra.com 11k
plesk/emailAddress=info@plesk.com 6k
XMPP, C2S†
onex 2k
s2548.pbxtra.fonality.com 2k
k66.ru/emailAddress=postmaster@k66.ru 500
hub.clickmyheart.net 400
John Doe 400
java2go 300
localhost 200
nt-home.ipworldcom 200
mail.visn.net/emailAddress=postmaster@mail.visn.net 200
cic-la-plata 200
certificate reuse on the Internet as a whole, many of these
servers seem not to be contacted commonly by clients, hinting
at a considerable server population that might be for private
use or only used by a small user population.
c) Common names: We show the Common Names in
some particularly common and invalid certificates in TA-
BLE VI.
Note that we cannot study if the subjects in certificates
match the host names where the certificates are deployed.
This would require scans based on a target list of domain
names and comparing the subjects in the received certificates
with the expected domain name. However, we only scanned
by IP addresses. Reverse DNS lookups could theoretically
produce domain names to compare against; however, due to
the way that servers are operated today, there is a risk that
the reverse lookup yields hostname aliases different from the
actual domain name by which the server is typically addressed.
Some interesting findings for SMTP on port 25 are as
follows. The certificates for *.bizmw contain the string ‘NTT
Communications Corporation’ in the ‘Organisation’ part of the
subject, a hint in which organisation these invalid certificates
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TABLE VII: Invalid Microsoft certificates: ASes and CIRCL
ranking for botnet and malicious activity.
AS number Registration information CIRCL rank
3257 TINET-BACKBONE Tinet SpA, DE 9532
3731 AFNCA-ASN - AFNCA Inc., US 4804
4250 ALENT-ASN-1 - Alentus Corporation,
US
9180
4436 AS-GTT-4436 - nLayer Communica-
tions, Inc., US
10,730
6762 SEABONE-NET TELECOM ITALIA
SPARKLE S.p.A., IT
11,887
11346 CIAS - Critical Issue Inc., US 557
13030 INIT7 Init7 (Switzerland) Ltd., CH 6255
14618 Amazon.com Inc., US 4139
16509 Amazon.com Inc., US 3143
18779 EGIHOSTING - EGIHosting, US 4712
21321 ARETI-AS Areti Internet Ltd.,GB 2828
23352 SERVERCENTRAL - Server Central
Network, US
11,135
26642 AFAS - AnchorFree Inc., US –
41095 IPTP IPTP LTD, NL 6330
54500 18779 - EGIHosting, US –
are used. The certificates for ‘localhost’ that are marked with
an asterisk all contain the string ‘Qmail Toaster Server’, thus
indicating that the responsible SMTP server was the popular
Qmail by djb. Presumably, the operators had never bothered
to install proper certificates. The ‘webaster’ certificate had
already made an appearance in the Web PKI study [24] and
is most likely due to a certificate creation software with a
spelling weakness. Plesk is the company behind the Parallels
visualisation product.
For IMAPS, we also find the popular ‘webaster’ certificate.
Furthermore we find certificates of several hosting companies
and also of Hurricane Electric. The certificates for Microsoft
were a surprise as they seemed to contain a Web address for
the Windows Update service. There were 18,193 occurrences
of this single end-host certificate. No intermediate or root
certificates were sent. The respective hosts were distributed
across 15 Autonomous Systems, which we looked up using
the Team Cymru ASN Database19.
TABLE VII shows the results of the lookups. None of the
ASes were registered to Microsoft; they were predominantly
assigned to hosters. We checked the BGP ranking of these
ASes with CIRCL’s web site, which as of 12 August 2015
contained 12,339 ASes ranked for known botnet and malicious
activity. Only two of the ASes were not on that list. Manual
inspection of the certificate did not yield anything out of the
ordinary, however. We contacted Microsoft repeatedly (directly
and via CIRCL), but never received a response why such a
certificate should occur on an email port.
Analyzing XMPP certificates also yielded some interesting
results. OneX is an XMPP server by Avaya, a commu-
nications company—this seems to be a default certificate.
Fonality is a provider of unified messaging. The certifi-
cates for k66.ru contained a string referring to a product
19https://asn.cymru.com/cgi-bin/whois.cgi
TABLE VIII: Authentication mechanisms offered by servers
on SUBMISSION port.
Mechanism Advertised Servers
PLAIN 2,764,157 99.27%
LOGIN 2,760,100 99.15%
CRAM-MD5 431,634 15.50%
DIGEST-MD5 230,152 8.26%
OTP 19,850 0.71%
GSSAPI 16,555 0.59%
NTLM 13,663 0.49%
XOAUTH2 3118 0.11%
PLAIN-CLIENTTOKEN 1642 0.05%
XOAUTH 1641 0.05%
Other 591 mechanisms found 5329 0.19%
called ‘CommuniGate’. It also appeared in the certificates for
visn.net. We were unable to determine the exact nature of
clickmyheart, but the Web site shows a login portal, so
we presume some forum. The certificates also contained the
name Zimbra Collaboration server. ‘John Doe’ is used in the
certificates by Jive Software. Java2go seems to be an SMS
product.
Beyond the strange Microsoft Update certificate, our results
suggest that a number of default keys and certificates are used
in production. This is a negative finding as it means that other
parties may have access to the private cryptographic material.
Some vendors, meanwhile, seem to choose their own, private
CA instead of working with a commercial one.
F. Poor CA practice
In our data set, we were still able to find certificates that
were issued directly from a root CA without any intermediate
certificate. The industry has moved away from this practice
and discourages it today [3]. To issue such certificates, the
CA’s root certificate needs to be kept online, a serious attack
vector. A root certificate compromise would necessitate an
update of all clients that include it. We expect the number
of certificates that are directly issued from a root certificate to
shrink further.
Indeed, there were very few cases already in our scan.
For SMTP, for instance, we found only 794 cases, or 0.07%
of verifiable chains. The percentages for SUBMISSION was
0.08%. Interestingly, it was 0.5% for SMTPS. SMTPS is
deprecated—it is not implausible that operators who still en-
able SMTPS have simply never upgraded to new, intermediate-
issued certificates. For good measure, we also tested this
property for the two IRC protocols (only one case for IRCS),
the two XMPP client-to-server variants (two for STARTTLS,
14 for XMPPS), and the two XMPP server-to-server variants
(one case each).
G. Authentication methods
We analysed the authentication mechanisms supported and
advertised by servers to clients when sending mails using
SUBMISSION or retrieving mails with IMAPS. In our ac-
tive measurements, we queried the servers for authentication
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TABLE IX: Authentication mechanisms offered by servers on
IMAPS port.
Mechanism Advertised Servers
PLAIN 3,753,658 96.66%
LOGIN 2,430,559 62.59%
CRAM-MD5 467,460 12.04%
CRAM-SHA1 186,355 4.80%
CRAM-SHA256 185,427 4.77%
DIGEST-MD5 160,893 4.14%
GSSAPI 18,851 0.49%
NTLM 17,106 0.44%
X-ZIMBRA 7582 0.20%
MSN 4181 0.11%
Other 61 mechanisms found 6773 0.17%
TABLE X: Combinations of authentication mechanisms of-
fered by servers on SUBMISSION port.
Mechanism Advertised Servers
PLAIN, LOGIN 2,092,594 75.15%
LOGIN, PLAIN 224,197 8.51%
LOGIN, CRAM-MD5, PLAIN 96,322 3.45%
LOGIN, PLAIN, CRAM-MD5 45,477 1.63%
DIGEST-MD5, CRAM-MD5, PLAIN, LOGIN 36,416 1.30%
CRAM-MD5, PLAIN, LOGIN 29,046 1.04%
PLAIN, LOGIN, CRAM-MD5 24,914 0.89%
CRAM-MD5, DIGEST-MD5, LOGIN, PLAIN 19,877 0.71%
PLAIN 17,079 0.61%
Other 1234 combinations found 326,392 7.11%
capabilities using the EHLO command for SUBMISSION and
the CAPABILITIES command for IMAPS. Capabilities were
always queried after TLS session establishment. We show
the most common authentication mechanisms in Tables VIII
and IX.
The results obtained for both SUBMISSION and IMAPS
show poor support for strong authentication mechanisms.
Mechanisms transmitting credentials in plaintext (PLAIN and
LOGIN) are supported by more than 99% of the SUBMIS-
SION and 90% of the IMAPS servers. On the other hand, less
than 16% of the SUBMISSION and 12.04% of the IMAPS
servers support much stronger mechanisms such as CRAM.
This is made worse by the fact that the vast majority of
SUBMISSION (84.86%) and IMAPS (87.43%) servers sup-
port only PLAIN and LOGIN. The ordering of authentication
mechanisms is not particularly encouraging, either: clients
obeying the ordering suggested by many servers will use a
plaintext mechanism for SUBMISSION (resp. IMAPS) in at
least 96.19% (resp. 89.35%) of the cases (Tables X and XI)
In addition, as part of our passive data collection, we also
measured which authentication methods servers offered. In
contrast to our active measurement, we can only record the au-
thentication methods offered before encryption starts, not those
after encryption has started. Table XII shows the percentage of
servers that offer a certain authentication mechanism as well as
the percentage of connections in which a certain authentication
TABLE XI: Combinations of authentication mechanisms of-
fered by servers on IMAPS port.
Mechanism Advertised Servers
PLAIN, LOGIN 2,222,721 60.16%
PLAIN 982,386 26.59%
CRAM-MD5, CRAM-SHA1, CRAM-
SHA256, PLAIN
183,813 4.97%
CRAM-MD5, PLAIN 90,341 2.45%
PLAIN, LOGIN, DIGEST-MD5, CRAM-MD5 78,061 2.11%
LOGIN 21,842 0.59%
CRAM-MD5, PLAIN, LOGIN, DIGEST-MD5 16,660 0.45%
PLAIN, LOGIN, CRAM-MD5 10,731 0.29%
CRAM-MD5, PLAIN, LOGIN, DIGEST-
MD5, NTLM
9105 0.25%
PLAIN, X-ZIMBRA 7569 0.20%
Other 1039 combinations found 71,685 1.94%
TABLE XII: Authentication mechanisms observed in connec-
tions on SUBMISSION port.
Mechanism Connections Servers
PLAIN 4.4% 39%
LOGIN 4.3% 37%
CRAM-MD5 0.7% 10%
DIGEST-MD5 0.5% 3.7%
XAOL-UAS-MB 0.4% 1.8%
GSSAPI 0.3% 4.3%
NTLM 0.3% 3.7%
XOAUTH2 0.03% 1.2%
XYMCOOKIE 0.01% 0.6%
mechanism was offered. Table XIII shows the combination of
authentication mechanisms offered that we observed.
The results here are not encouraging—while, according to
Table XIII, only 68.88% of servers offer authentication before
STARTTLS, 39.87% of all servers offer only authentication
based on PLAIN and LOGIN. When looking at the number
of connections, this picture is even more pronounced with
only 4.94% of connections containing information about au-
thentication mechanisms before STARTTLS, but 3.51% of all
observed connections containing only plaintext authentication
mechanisms. This is consistent with our findings in Sec-
tion IV-A that showed that 97% of SUBMISSION connections
upgraded their connection using STARTTLS. Nonetheless,
71% of clients who did not upgrade their connections also
used plaintext mechanisms to authenticate.
Moreover, 31% of observed IMAP servers (serving 16% of
passively observed connections) refused plaintext logins before
encryption (with the LOGINDISABLED capability).
V. RISKS, THREATS, AND MITIGATION
In this section, we first summarise the current risks and
threats to Internet communication protocols, based on our
analyses. We also present recommendations on how to improve
the situation in the future. For our discussion, it is important
to consider which attacker one wishes to defend against: some
security configurations are strong enough against passive,
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TABLE XIII: Combinations of authentication mechanisms
observed in connections on SUBMISSION port..
Mechanisms Connections Servers
PLAIN, LOGIN 1.82% 20.86%
LOGIN, PLAIN 1.68% 18.40%
LOGIN,PLAIN,XAOL-UAS-MB 0.19% 1.84%
PLAIN,LOGIN,XAOL-UAS-MB 0.16% 1.84%
GSSAPI 0.11% 1.23%
GSSAPI,NTLM 0.10% 1.84%
LOGIN,PLAIN,CRAM-MD5 0.09% 3.68%
DIGEST-MD5,CRAM-MD5 0.09% 0.61%
CRAM-MD5,DIGEST-MD5 0.09% 0.61%
PLAIN,LOGIN,CRAM-MD5 0.08% 0.61%
Other 17 combinations observed 1.09% 14.68%
eavesdropping attackers. They are thus secure against global
pervasive monitoring of traffic: active attacks require much
higher effort and can, in all likelihood, not be carried out on
global scale yet.
A. STARTTLS semantics
Many of the discussed communication protocols, and es-
pecially SMTP, rely on STARTTLS to initiate encrypted
connections. The problem is that, as shown in Section IV-A,
less than 51% of servers support upgrading connections to
TLS. Fortunately, some providers pushed strongly for better
adoption of TLS in the last years, increasing the share of con-
nections that use TLS by a significant amount. Nonetheless,
in the interest of reliability, many clients and servers will fall
back to non-encrypted connections should STARTTLS not be
offered.
B. Cipher use
A common problem is the continued choice of weak ciphers
in communication protocols. Depending on the protocol, we
still see up to 17% of connections choosing RC4, which has
been deprecated in [36]. This is in contrast to the Web at large,
where currently about 10% of connections use RC4 ciphers,
according to the ICSI Certificate Notary. This difference is
likely caused by the push to increment Web security in the
last few years, where academia, industry, and the open source
community have driven adoption of more modern ciphers.
This movement does not seem to have reached other, non-web
protocols. Another fact that supports this hypothesis is the high
number of connections that do not use forward-secure ciphers
(more than 30% for some of the protocols we observed).
Another issue is the use of Diffie-Hellman parameter sizes
of 1024 bits or less in more than 23 of all observed connections.
While there are some limited cases in which this might be
necessary for legacy compatibility20, it seems unlikely that
this is a conscious choice by server operators.
20Java≤7 cannot use DH parameters larger than 1024 bits; see
http://blog.ivanristic.com/2014/03/ssl-tls-improvements
-in-java-8.html.
C. Certificate chains and their validity
We showed that a high number of servers, especially as
compared to earlier scans of the HTTPS protocol, serve
chains using broken or self-signed certificates. This is of
particular importance for SMTP with STARTTLS. If servers
with unverifiable certificates are actually able to receive email
from SSL/TLS-capable servers, this suggests that a significant
number of servers are not verifying certificates in outgoing
connections or ignore certificate errors. This means that there
are likely many cases where SSL/TLS does not provide MitM
protection in server-to-server connections, a finding that is also
supported by [12]. As noted before, SMTP tends to prioritise
delivery before security (for good reason), and operators will
likely favour such an approach to ensure messages reach their
destination. On a more positive note, our passive data did
reveal that, unlike the servers at large, a much larger ratio of
the connections we observed used chains that we could verify.
We assume this to be due to the fact that large providers are
more capable and willing to invest the time in securing their
SSL/TLS setups.
D. Authentication methods
The more secure challenge-response authentication mech-
anisms for SMTP and IMAP do not seem to enjoy much
popularity: the methods PLAIN and LOGIN are preferred. We
speculate this is because operators tend to assume their con-
nections are already secure because of the use of SSL/TLS—
however, this is only true if certificates are actually correct and
strong ciphers are used. We also found that client authentica-
tion methods are sometimes offered before the negotiation of a
SSL/TLS session—the vast majority being PLAIN and LOGIN
again. This means that an eavesdropper or active MitM can
collect the plaintext of specific messages and is also able to
acquire login credentials.
E. Suggestions for improvement
We offer several actionable recommendations based on our
analyses.
a) Observable infrastructure: One key element to im-
proving messaging security is to create awareness. We be-
lieve better observability can be provided in a two-pronged
approach: through more regular active scans, but also by
facilitating observation of the security of one’s own commu-
nication. Much insight can be gained by security-conscious
users by information available on the dashboards mentioned
in Section II-E. We believe that current efforts like SSL Pulse,
which aims to enhance the use and security of TLS on the
Web, should be extended to other communication protocols.
The coverage should also be extended to the entire Internet.
The data provided by censys.io [8] is a good source.
Auditing mechanisms that so far are meant primarily for use
on the Web, such as Certificate Transparency by Google, could
also be extended to include email or chat servers.
Another way to improve the situation would be for client
software to have clearer user warnings when connecting to
servers in insecure ways. Unlike the Web, the messaging
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infrastructure uses intermediate relays. It is, however, possible
to derive (partial) information about the path an email has
taken or is going to take [12]. User-agents could be extended
to report information about this and signal if the used cryp-
tography is deemed secure.
b) Deployability and configuration: The high number of
invalid or otherwise unverifiable certificate chains is a serious
obstacle to the ubiquitous adoption of STARTTLS for email
forwarding. Two of the reasons for this poor deployment are
the costs of certification by CAs and the high difficulty of
proper server configuration. The Let’s Encrypt21 initiative,
which currently focuses on Web certification, addresses both
issues and should be extended to include email and chat.
However, configuration complexity is not straight-forward to
address. BetterCrypto.org22, for example, provides a guide to
correct TLS configuration. This approach scales poorly as
almost every software suite uses its own configuration format
(or so it often seems). We thus call for a standard for unified
SSL/TLS configuration: there is no reason why certificates and
cryptography cannot be configured using a unified syntax.
Configuration files for SSL/TLS could simply be included (or
parsed) in the general configuration of a software.
A recent RFC [5] describes how to increase the security
of SMTP opportunistically by using the TLSA record of
DNS [21] to signal TLS support. This removes CAs as a single
point of failure. Due to its opportunistic nature, the approach
can be deployed incrementally. It defeats attackers carrying
out global pervasive monitoring. However, DNS/DNSSEC is
once again a complex system—thus, this approach also calls
for better configuration support and a unified configuration
syntax.
c) Flag-days for mandatory encryption: Large providers
should research the impact of refusing insecure connections—
this may cause smaller providers to use verifiable chains. To
preserve reliability of delivery, providers could deploy a form
of grey-listing for senders using insecure connections and only
offer fast message delivery to mail servers capable of using
SSL/TLS in a secure fashion.
A broad call for mandatory encryption and enforcing
STARTTLS before using a connection could further push the
adoption of better security practices. An example showing
that community-based actions have a chance of succeeding is
XMPP23. This can be combined with a pinning-like approach
where clients refuse plaintext connections, especially to popu-
lar servers, if previous connections had used STARTTLS. This
is in line with the findings of [9], where the authors show that
certain ISPs may try to downgrade connections by stripping
STARTTLS commands.
A further step to foster the proper use of SSL/TLS could
be taken by package and operating system maintainers. If
packages shipped with a safe, modern configuration for the
ciphers to use, many of the problems we highlighted could
21https://letsencrypt.org/
22https://bettercrypto.org
23http://blog.prosody.im/mandatory-encryption-on-xmpp
-starts-today/
be remedied. A summary of the best current practices for this
purpose can be found in [43]. Conversely, application packages
should never be shipped with default cryptographic material,
not even as examples. A saner approach would be to provide
scripts to generate the keys and certificates.
d) Application-layer authentication: Challenge-response
authentication mechanisms like CRAM and SCRAM avoid
sending credentials over the wire. SCRAM even allows servers
to store the password in non-plaintext form, thus combining
improved credential storage with safer authentication. Support
for challenge-response forms of authentication seems to be
lacking, possibly because developers see no need for it and
operators fear the complexity. Standard packages and unified
configuration can help here.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented the largest study of the security of
the standard Internet messaging infrastructure to date. Based
on active scans of servers and passive monitoring of client
connections, we collected the parameters used to establish
SSL/TLS sessions, the details of X.509 certificates offered
by servers, and the application-layer authentication methods
offered to, and used by, clients. Across the whole Internet, we
found a worryingly high number of poorly secured servers.
This was either due to cryptographic parameter and cipher
choices or due to invalid or duplicated cryptographic material.
Too many servers also offer weak application-layer authenti-
cation methods. A silver lining is that there are significantly
better deployments in the most popular services, and a majority
of observed clients connected using reasonably secure parame-
ters when they did request encryption. Nonetheless, too many
of the connections we observed were still performed in the
clear. Moreover, we found that many client-to-server setups,
especially for SMTP, did not use valid credentials. This means
that email in transit may often be delivered over unencrypted
and unauthenticated hops. We gave a list of recommendations
that are actionable and can help to significantly improve the
situation.
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